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Abstract 
Smashing initial hopes for more radical and speedier changes in Russia, elements of the 
Soviet system of managerial and ideological control proved to be obstinately persistent. Certain 
practices reminiscent of the informal functioning of the Soviet nomenklatura continue unabated 
primarily in politics, but also in Russian media. This article argues that nomenklatura practices 
are still a fixed part in organization management in Russian media today, securing the loyalty of 
journalists and controlling the output of the news media. The analysis of 30 semi-structured 
interviews and three case studies, scrutinizing media managers’ professional biographies, directs 
to a non-intuitive development; namely, that it is not necessarily those who have experienced the 
Soviet nomenklatura closely and in person who were most active in applying and perpetuating 
nomenklatura practices, but also those who were either remote from these power structures or 
too young.  
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Introduction 
Monday, 9 December 2013, was a typical chilly mid-winter day in Moscow. Svetlana 
Mironiuk, the editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti, the second-biggest Russian national news agency, 
went about her regular business: she met her editors, conducted a short meeting with a minister 
and went to instruct the newsroom. In the afternoon Mironiuk received a call from the Kremlin. 
Sergey Ivanov, Putin’s Head of Administration, was calling to tell her that her services were no 
longer needed. Mironiuk’s career was over. This all came as a big shock to everyone, not just to 
Mironiuk, but also to the whole journalistic community. In many respects, it looked like one of 
those hostile takeovers of the media outlet which had become typical of Putin’s Russia.4 One 
aspect, however, was unusual. It was a takeover of a state enterprise orchestrated by state 
officials against someone with excellent backing from within the Kremlin.5  
Mironiuk, born 1969, spent her childhood in embassies across the world as the 
daughter of Foreign Office technical support staff. The task of the young and energetic PR 
specialist, who first came to RIA Novosti in 2003, was to reshape that secondary national 
                                                 
4 Jill Dougherty, “Putin’s Iron-Fisted Message”, The Huffington Post, 23 March 2014, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jill-dougherty/putins-ironfisted-message_b_5044092.html, accessed 30 
August 2016. 
5 Mironiuk was considered a protégé of either Mikhail Lesin (then Minister of Press & Mass 
Communications) or of Sergey Ivanov. 
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state-owned wire service which had grown out of the Soviet foreign broadcasting agency 
APN. By December 2013, RIA Novosti outnumbered all non-TV Russian media in terms of 
audience, brand awareness, international respect and influence.6 Although it was a state media 
company, RIA Novosti followed international standards in news coverage and, in general, was 
committed to be a sort of public media rather than state partisan. It ran live broadcasts from 
courtrooms, at times even covering cases against the Russian opposition that exposed how 
biased the Kremlin could be towards its opponents. 
However modernized and up-to-date RIA Novosti was, it had preserved practices in its 
daily functioning which were reminiscent of the nomenklatura, the Soviet model of ideological 
and personnel control. During her time at RIA Novosti even young and modern Mironiuk had 
established nomenklatura-like relations with her staff. Together with her management team 
she exercised a considerable amount of coercion and demanded obedience from the staff; for 
example, (despite some leniency) repeatedly reprimanding their journalists for speaking out 
                                                 
6 See, for example, “TNS Web Index: Auditoriia internet-proektov”, TNS Global, December 2013, 
available at http://www.tns-global.ru/services/media/media-
audience/internet/information/?download=490&date=2013%2012&arrFilter_pf[YEAR]=2013&set_filter=Y, 
accessed 30 September 2016. 
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in support of the opposition. Others, in turn, were generously rewarded for their loyalty. They 
could usually fully count on Mironiuk’s support and were given free rein to carry out their 
work autonomously in their own manner. Mironiuk always made sure that they were safe from 
any pressure or interference from the Presidential Administration.  
From nomenklatura to nomenklaturnost’ 
Mironiuk was just one example of how very distinct managerial practices bear 
nomenklatura features in today’s Russia. This article explores the management style of other 
leading Russian media managers as an important pillar of Russia’s system of governance by 
examining the career paths of leading Russian media managers from Soviet to post-Soviet times. 
We ask to what extent management practices, inherited from the Soviet period, have been 
preserved in today’s Russian media.  
Alena Ledeneva calls Putin’s system of governance sistema, defined as a set of informal 
practices and rules familiar to every member of the ruling elite.7 Her analysis of sistema 
provides the grounds for our close-up analysis of Russian media managers. In contrast to 
sistema, which analyses the system of governance as a whole, we switch our lenses away from 
                                                 
7 Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works? The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics 
and Business (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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the system onto the microcosm of media organizations. Thus, taking sistema as a basis, we 
zoom into managerial styles media managers, whether nomenklatura-socialized or not, have 
developed throughout the post-Soviet period and examine to what extent Soviet nomenklatura 
practices are still prevalent in 2016.  
Drawing on Mark Granovetter’s approach to the cultural embeddedness of management 
styles, we will trace how the institutional settings of media outlets in Russia are affected by the 
behavioural strategies employed by their owners/managers and social relations between them, 
the authorities and their staff. Similar questions have been asked in management studies and 
organizational sociology; how structures survive and hinder progress and whether newcomers, 
such as foreigners or representatives of the younger generation, can make a difference in ethics, 
management styles and output.8 These scholars’ focus is, understandably, primarily on industry 
and finance, rather than media organizations.9  
With this research, we attempt to demonstrate that nomenklaturnost’ – denoting features 
reminiscent of the nomenklatura – is an important element of media management practice in 
                                                 
8 Gregory Schwartz & Leo McCann, “Overlapping effects: Path dependence and path generation in 
management and organization in Russia”, Human Relations 60, no.10 (2006): 1525–1549; Eugene D. 
Jaffe & Alexandr Tsimerman, “Business ethics in a transition economy: Will the next Russian generation 
be any better?” Journal of Business Ethics, 62 (2005): 87–97. 
9 Vasily Gatov, “O sud’bakh progul’shchikov na obochine progressa”, Otechestvennye zapiski, no. 3 
(2014), available at http://www.strana-oz.ru/2014/3/o-sudbah-progulshchikov-na-obochine-progressa, 
accessed 29 August 2016; Anna Kachkaeva, “Istoriia televideniia v Rossii: mezhdu vlast’iu, svobodoi i 
sobstvennostiu”, Istoriia novoi Rossii, available at http://www.ru-90.ru/node/1316, accessed 16 August 
2016. 
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modern Russia. Nomenklaturnost’ today plays an important role in the maintenance of loyalty and 
self-censorship. It derives from the Soviet system but differs from it. An important feature of the 
Soviet nomenklatura system was its paralegality. Apart from the very vague Article 6 of the 
Constitution of the USSR (1977), which established the role of the Communist Party as ‘leading 
and directing force of the Soviet society’, no single line in the legislation recognized the existence 
of the nomenklatura system, and yet it was universal covering the whole Sistema. It was 
omnipresent and uniform in all types of organizations.  
The nomenklatura was based on the close bonds between patrons and their loyal cadres 
(control), a combination of traditional ‘patron-client’ relationship where the added element was the 
Communist Party, which wielded control over both patrons and clients. In order to enter the 
nomenklatura and make career, junior cadres had to seek out patrons in senior positions who 
ensured them a future within the state bureaucracy. Loyal cadres themselves accumulated their 
own pool of loyal cadres to increase their personal status, influence and material benefits 
(corruption).10 As the Soviet system had not relied on private economic capital as a source of 
wealth and power, it used access to certain levels of goods and services as a substitute. This 
could be access to special food stores or to the 4th Chief Directorate of Ministry of Health, which 
provided top medical services to the Party elite. Those who did not abide by the rules of the 
nomenklatura were subject to collective punishment (coercion). A rebellious nomenklatura 
member lost any career prospects or chances for professional development. The higher a 
member of the nomenklatura rose, the more he/she had to lose. This meant that the accumulation 
                                                 
10 This system of material benefits and corruption is not to be mistaken with “blat” which existed far 
beyond the nomenklatura and was in many aspects running counter nomenklatura interests, as it was far 
less controllable. The Russian word blat denotes the informal exchange of favours and goods, often 
based on friendship and connections; however independent of nomenklatura membership. 
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of nomenklatura members’ resources also made them vulnerable to coercion and kept them under 
control of senior cadres.  
Having inherited some features of Soviet system, nomenklaturnost’ today serves a similar 
goal; personnel control and loyalty assurance. Nomenklaturnost’, however, differs from the 
original nomenklatura in many ways. First, it does not exist as a uniform sistema-wide, 
omnipresent principle. Rather, it is a ‘feature’ of particular organizations. Second, 
nomenklaturnost’ is much more a ‘moneyed’ practice. This is because modern Russia is, in 
contrast to the Soviet Union, not a scarcity-based society. Those benefiting from nomenklaturnost’ 
do not receive status-related treats as a status gratification, such as access to special shops. 
Nomenklaturnost’ relies on various forms of, often illegal or semi-legal, profit sharing between 
patron and client, e.g. state budget contracts or Kremlin contacts. Not least, nomenklaturnost’ 
features some mafia-like elements, such as an oath to keep relationship under wraps. The case 
studies below will demonstrate these modifications. 
Nomenklatura research 
The nomenklatura has been studied both in Soviet and post-Soviet times as a crucial 
element of the Soviet political machinery to recruit new cadres and exercise control over the Party 
apparatus.11 In the 1970s the Soviet historian Mikhail Voslenskii produced the first close-up 
                                                 
11 Bohdan Harasymiw, “Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party’s Leadership Recruitment System”, 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 2, no. 4 (1969): 493-512; Alec Nove, “Is there a Ruling Class in the 
USSR?” Soviet Studies 28, no. 4 (1975): 615-38; Evan Mawdsley and Stephen White, The Soviet Elite 
from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Central Committee and its Members, 1917-1991 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
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observation of the Soviet nomenklatura12, which gave the impetus for research on the 
phenomenon and, together with the work by the Yugoslav communist Milovan Dzhilas13, for a 
popular-academic application of the term. In our analysis, we will borrow three terms from 
Voslenskii which encapsulate the functioning of the Soviet system of governance: coercion, 
control and corruption. 
In the late Soviet period the nomenklatura was vividly discussed by Sovietology, which, 
due to the lack of the first-hand data and reliable information, interpreted the changes in Soviet 
politics by analyzing the changes in its leadership.14 The opening of the archives in the 1980s 
gave scholars, both in Russia and the West, access to previously confidential documents who 
subsequently produced detailed accounts of the phenomenon. In the first years of post-Soviet 
transition, the major concern of academics was to what extent the incumbent Soviet nomenklatura 
would reproduce itself in the new political and business elite and to what extent it would be 
replaced by new groups of politicians and businessmen. The rapid and non-transparent process 
of economic reforms caused many observers to claim that the new Russian economy was largely 
                                                 
12 Mikhail Voslenskii, Nomenklatura: gospodstvuiushchii klass Sovetskogo Soiuza (London: Overseas 
Publications Interchange, 1990), 12. 
13 Milovan Dzhilas, Novyi klass: analiz kommunisticheskoi sistemy (New York: FA Prager), 39, 53-54.  
14 Thomas H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968); Albert L. Weeks, Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of Civilian and 
Military Officials (Washington: Washington Institute Press, 1988). 
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based on a new class of nomenklatura capitalists.15 They saw the old Soviet elite weathering the 
transition particularly well when compared to other formerly communist countries.16 
Many scholars attribute the nomenklatura re-emergence, albeit in a transformed shape, 
to the administrative reforms carried out in the 2000s and the authoritarian tendencies of Putin’s 
regime.17 While some say that the basic nomenklatura principles of political management were 
either preserved or quickly re-adopted18, other regard it an oversimplification to say that the post-
Soviet elites of Yeltsin’s time have entirely reproduced the previous experience of the old 
nomenklatura.19 Instead, the political stage, filled with multiple actors navigating through a set of 
ambiguous and non-transparent informal rules. This has created a more complex system with a 
great diversity of entry- and exit-strategies.  
                                                 
15 Martin Malia, “The Nomenklatura Capitalists”, New Republic, 22 May 1995; and Jonathan Steele, “The 
Lazarus Act of the Nomenklatura”, Guardian, May 30, 1992. 
16 Ivan Szelényi & Szonja Szelényi, “Circulation or reproduction of elites during the post-communist 
transformation of Eastern Europe”, Theory and Society 25, no. 5 (2005): 615-638; Ol’ga Kryshtanovskaia, 
“Transformation of the Old Nomenklatura into a new Russian elite”, Russian Social Science Review 37, 
no. 4, (1996): 18-40; and Ol’ga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to 
Russian Elite”, Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 5 (1996): 711-733. 
17 Eugene Huskey, “Nomenklatura Lite? The Cadres Reserve in Russian Public Administration”, Problems 
of Post-Communism 51, no. 2 (2004): 30-39. 
18 Joel C. Moses, “Who Has Led Russia? Russian Regional Political Elites, 1954-2006”, Europe-Asia 
Studies 60, no. 1 (2008): 1-24. 
19 David Lane, “Transition Under Yeltsin: the Nomenklatura and Political Elite Circulation”, Political 
Studies 45, no. 5 (1997): 855-874. 
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As for media, a number of studies provide a vibrant account of the Soviet media landscape 
and the corpus of research on the perestroika and post-1991 developments is especially rich.20 
The state of the research on nomenklatura practices in the Soviet and post-Soviet media, and 
research on media management in general, is, however, very limited. This study aims to fill this 
gap.  
Research questions and data 
We trace today’s nomenklaturnost’ by dissecting the managerial practices of three leading 
media managers. We look at them through the prism of their professional biographies. Biography 
here serves as a framework within which one can see the set of practices characteristic of a media 
manager and how they have evolved over time. These sets of practices will be interrogated 
through the three nomenklatura principles established by Voslenskii: coercion, control and 
corruption. The media managers scrutinized are Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of Moskovskii 
Komsomolets; Vladimir Sungorkin, editor-in-chief of Komsomol’skaia Pravda; and Oleg 
Dobrodeev, head of the media holding VGTRK. We interviewed one of these three media 
managers, but mostly draw on a rich collection of literature and publicly available material.21  
                                                 
20 See, Ivan Zasoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (London: Routledge, 2003); Olessia 
Koltsova, News Media and Power in Russia (London: Routledge, 2006); Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention 
of Russia: The Journey from Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War (London: Atlantic Books, 2015); Kristin 
Roth-Ey, How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca & London: 
Cornell University Press, 2011); Ellen Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Ellen Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the 
Struggle for Power in Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
21 Pavel Gusev, interview by Elisabeth Schimpfossl, 12 February 2016, Moscow, Russia. 
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We also conducted semi-structured interviews with 25 journalists and media managers 
who have personally known these media managers and whose professional lives have 
intersected with them. They are aged between 30 and 75. Six of them preferred to stay 
anonymous. Four of the journalists have worked in all three media outlets led by the media 
managers in focus. Six journalists work or have worked for Moskovskii Komsomolets, three for 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda and five for VGTRK. Four of the journalists were members of the Soviet 
nomenklatura and, thus, are well versed in the internal rules and requirements. 11 journalists 
came to the profession after 1991 and, hence, learned about how the nomenklatura works only 
when it was being re-established in the post-Soviet period. 
In addition, we conducted interviews with four former security service officers to 
understand the underlying relations between nomenklatura members in the KGB and the Soviet 
and post-Soviet mass media. One of them was a KGB general responsible for ideological issues. 
Another KGB officer worked as a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 
onwards. One was a diplomat who also occupied a high-ranking position in a research institution 
and, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, became a senior official at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. The fourth person was part of the operational staff gathering insider information about 
employees in media outlets. We conducted three further interviews with political technologists.  
We selected the three media managers for their very different backgrounds and the 
varying career paths they represent. Gusev was born into a nomenklatura family and, thus, 
imbued with their principles from infancy. He was already high-up in the nomenklatura hierarchy 
in pre- perestroika times. Sungorkin (born 1954) was not from a privileged family background. He 
slowly climbed up the ladder and adopted nomenklatura principles to get access and sucess, 
which he eventually achieved during Gorbachev’s perestroika. Dobrodeev was never listed as 
Soviet nomenklatura member.  
 12 
These different trajectories are despite the fact that the three managers represent the 
same generation, born between 1949 (Gusev) and 1959 (Dobrodeev), with the older two being 
early post-war baby boomers and the youngest one a late baby boomer. They are old enough to 
have experienced several periods of Soviet life, from Khrushchev’s Thaw in their childhood to 
Brezhnev’s stagnation in their youth.22  
Three cases make a small sample, but the population of media managers they represent 
is small too. A second reason to choose only three arose from our methodological approach, as 
biographical studies require going into considerable depth. Despite its small size, this set of cases 
represents a variety of career paths. This does not allow us to extrapolate the results and 
generalize about the wider population; however, the analysis provides us with valuable indicators 
and a sound starting point for a possibly larger project about the strategies media managers 
applied to became successful in the 1990s and in the 2000s. 
The Soviet media nomenklatura and changes during perestroika 
Media were the core ideological tool of the Soviet regime. Journalism was considered a 
service to the state. Senior ranks in most Soviet press organizations required Party membership, 
at least until 1989. The Kremlin heavily relied on censorship. The Soviet Union’s censorship 
agency, Glavlit, exercised control over every single media product. At the level of editors and 
influential journalists, media staff were fully commanded and controlled by the Party. Editors-in-
chief in particular could not possibly be assigned to a post without consent and approval of the 
                                                 
22 Several scholars studied generational specifics in depth. See, for example, Donald Raleigh, Soviet 
Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia’s Cold War Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Juliane Furst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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respective Party committee. The Party also exercised full authority over the removal of editors, 
who would be blacklisted once fallen out of favour. The chosen individuals usually accepted their 
appointment or dismissal without resistance.23  
Depending on their rank, nomenklatura members in the media exercised, and were 
exposed to, coercion in the form of direct pressure, blackmailing and the fear of job loss. Loyalty 
was strengthened via special rewards, such as promotion and access to privileges, which opened 
the gates to various forms of corruption, but the members’ close personal networks was the 
biggest guarantee. If someone stopped playing along, they lost everything with the consequence 
that all their loyal cadres lost their positions as well. 
Being the Party’s main newspaper, Pravda enjoyed special status. Its editors-in-chief were 
appointed by the Politburo.24 This level of importance and attention was otherwise only attributed 
to the Chairman of the Television and Radio Committee (Gosteleradio SSSR). Most department 
editors and some top reporters at Pravda were senior nomenklatura members.25 As were the 
editors-in-chief at Izvestiia, the newspaper of the Soviet Union’s Supreme Council, their deputies 
and executive editors. Izvestiia’s editor-in-chief was usually also a member of the Party’s Central 
                                                 
23 Only one editor-in-chief, Vitaly Korotich of Ogonёk, refused when the Secretary of the Central 
Committee Egor Ligachev demanded his resignation in 1989. See, Anatolii Cherniaev, ed., V Politbiuro 
TsK KPSS: Po zapisiam Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985-
1991). (Moscow: Gorbachev-Fond, 2008), 415-416. 
24 Cherniaev, V Politbiuro TsK KPSS, 601-604. 
25 In 1985, out of the 21 Pravda editorial board members, 4 were Politburo members, 3 were candidates 
to the Politburo and the remaining 14 were members of the Central Committee. Raymond E. Zickel, 
ed. Soviet Union, a country study (Washington: Library of Congress, 1989). 
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Committee.26 In television and radio, nomenklatura participation was less pervasive and much 
less systematic than in the print press, although the most important positions there were also 
ranked as nomenklatura. Some major political commentators on Soviet television concurrently 
held positions at the Central Committee.27 
The policies of glasnost and the demands for freedom of speech under Gorbachev 
emerged in part because of opposition to the privileges of the nomenklatura and the inequalities 
these privileges created. From 1985 onwards, ideological pressure began to ease noticeably. 
Some key appointments Gorbachev made triggered radical changes. Alexander Yakovlev, who 
was exiled as ambassador to Canada in 1973, returned to the Soviet Union in 1985 and was 
appointed as the head of the Party’s department of propaganda. These events caused some 
major rotation and reshuffling of cadres. Yakovlev got rid of a whole generation of Brezhnevites. 
The liberally-minded cadres he appointed were instrumental in the process of democratization in 
late Soviet society. Journalists now suddenly had the freedom to express their thoughts, to design 
new programmes and even to set up new media outlets. Now it became possible rise to influential 
positions based on talent rather than being closely linked with the nomenklatura.  
Post-Soviet developments 
                                                 
26 Izvestiia board members could use the Party hospital, which was frequented by the Soviet top elite. 
Vasilii Zakharko, Zvezdnye chasy i drama “Izvestii”. Za kulisami znamenitoi gazety (Moscow: Vremia, 
2015), 11, 75. 
27 Among them was Alexander Bovin who, between 1963 and 1972, headed a group of consultants in the 
International Department of the Politburo, worked as Leonid Brezhnev's ghost-writer and, parallel to that, 
presented the TV programme International Panorama. 
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While power was transferred from Gorbachev to Yeltsin in late 1991, the old media 
nomenklatura made great efforts to cling onto power. As Arkady Ostrovsky observes, many media 
managers in the early 1990s were ‘the ultimate golden youth of the Soviet elite’.28 Among them 
were well-known names such as Vladimir Yakovlev, founder of the newspaper Kommersant and 
son of Egor Yakovlev, the editor of Moscow News and later head of Ostankino TV; and Alexander 
Lyubimov, one of the presenters of Vzgliad, a progressive and liberal perestroika television news 
programme, and son of Mikhail Liubimov, a high-ranked KGB intelligence officer.29 Although in 
favour of a new, democratic Russia, these people were Soviet in their moral, ethical 
understanding. The majority of people working for them in the newsrooms were also not new, 
continuing their old practices. 
When the economic crisis of 1992 set in, major figures in the media nomenklatura – some 
of whom will be described below – appealed to Yeltsin for financial support. Yeltsin was happy to 
grant them large subsidies, as this provided him with an opportunity to force them into loyalty and 
conformity.30 Yeltsin’s strategy worked. As soon as the Kremlin was powerful enough, it returned 
to a nomenklatura style of media management, including direct command and control.31 As early 
as the 1990s, by inviting leading media managers to attend regular meetings with the presidential 
                                                 
28 Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, 72 
29 Dmitri Bykov, “The State of Russian Media, 1990-2000”, Seans, no. 4 (2001): 41. 
30 Vasily Gatov, Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly (London: The Henry 
Jackson Society, 2015), 4, available at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Putin-
Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf, accessed 12 December 2016.   
31 Aleksandr Yakovlev, “Restoration of the nomenklatura in Russia”, New Perspectives Quarterly 21, no. 2 
(2004): 45-48. 
 16 
administration, the Kremlin created a media elite with access to all the benefits that closeness to 
power centres provides.   
Shortly afterwards, in the early 2000s, the Kremlin started replacing independent media 
owners and managers by ones loyal to them and installed trusted editors. The Presidential 
Administration started sending out representatives to media outlets, private as well as state-
aligned, to define their agenda and participate in management questions. A government proposal 
from 2000 – entitled Edition Number 6 – envisaged the monitoring of all commercial and political 
activity any media outlets and journalists engaged in. The aim was to disclose their financial 
sources to cut off money flows if deemed necessary. Edition Number 6 also envisioned the return 
of security agents’ infiltration in the newsrooms.32 The Kremlin has never confirmed the 
authenticity of this document. However, some subsequent changes during the Putin era media, 
suggest that the document exists. Since then, Russian media have been under constant political 
pressure from the Kremlin, exercised primarily through economic enslavement and restrictive 
legal means. These oppressive policies can only succeed when the owners, editors and 
journalists comply with the overall political framing. We suggest that such strong compliance could 
only be reached with the re-instalment of the nomenklatura model, which was familiar to both 
media managers and their staff and has since provided efficient obedience.  
The following part of the article will explore in detail how nomenklatura practices have 
resurfaced in the careers of the three major media managers of the post-Soviet period.  
                                                 
32 Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 252-
273. 
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Case I: Pavel Gusev (Moskovskii Komsomolets) 
Moskovskii Komsomolets is Moscow’s most popular daily. Since 1983 it has been edited 
and, after 1991, owned by Pavel Gusev. Gusev stems from a prominent Party family: his father, 
Nikolai, was the director of Vneshtorgizdat, a publishing house related to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade.33 Between 1975 and 1980 he served as secretary of the Moscow Party Committee and 
from 1980 to 1983 as the deputy head of the International Department of the Komsomol Central 
Committee34.  
Moskovskii Komsomolets used to be distributed only in Moscow. The few nomenklatura 
positions within the newspaper were given to members of the Moscow Party Committee. Apart 
from the editor-in-chief, his first deputy and executive editor, all other positions were filled by 
professional staff, regardless of their Komsomol or Party affiliation.35 This freedom allowed Gusev 
to run his own staff policy as he wished. Shortly after becoming editor-in-chief, he replaced most 
departmental editors and deputies with well-trained and talented journalists and editors.36  
Within his publishing house, Gusev exercised a strict management style. Very few have 
ever challenged his editorial decisions and practices and for those who did this would be their last 
day at Moskovskii Komsomolets. The former deputy editor Ayder Mudzhabaev, for example, 
                                                 
33 Pavel Gusev, interview by Elisabeth Schimpfossl, 5 February 2016, Moscow, Russia. 
34 See Gusev’s’ official biography: “Gusev Pavel Nikolaevich”, Sovet pri Prezidente Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka, available at http://president-
sovet.ru/members/constitution/read/48/, accessed 30 August 2016. 
35 Elena Vasiliukhina, MK executive editor at the time of interview, Skype-interview by Vasily Gatov, 21 
May 2015. 
36 Aleksandr Perov, “Geroi nashego vremeni Gusev”, Solidarnost', no. 25 (1992): 8.   
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criticized Gusev’s decision to comply with the Kremlin’s rules as to how to report on Crimea and 
Ukraine. As a Crimean Tatar Mudzhabaev was very much opposed to the Russian annexation of 
the peninsula. He was forced to resign, as his opinions on social media representation would 
apparently harm the newspaper.37  
Although Moskovskii Komsomolets is much less exposed to coercive pressure from the 
authorities as, for example, the openly oppositional Novaia Gazeta, or even the two cases to be 
discussed below, Gusev and his team nevertheless faced numerous attempts by bureaucrats at 
local and federal levels to manipulate the newspaper’s agenda. Under the rule of Moscow’s long-
term mayor Yurii Luzhkov from 1993 to 2011, Moskovskii Komsomolets journalists felt regularly 
very much ‘obliged’, if not directly instructed, to positively cover certain initiatives launched by the 
mayor’s office. Columnists were asked to provide opinion pieces that supported the mayor’s point 
of view or defend him from federal government criticism.38 
Many of Gusev’s journalists later carved out influential careers outside the media, 
something Gusev has always encouraged because he realized the important role such people 
can later play to protect him and his media outlet. Among the most notable figures who started 
their careers at Moskovskii Komsomolets is Natalia Timakova, once the newspaper’s political 
reporter. In 2000 she became Putin’s press secretary and then Dmitri Medvedev’s deputy in the 
Presidential Administration; currently Mrs Timakova serves as press attaché of the Russian 
Government. Alexander Budberg used to be Moskovskii Komsomolets’s political editor. Today he 
heads the Bolshoi Theatre Board of Trustees, an important institution in Moscow city life and a 
springboard to influential social networks. Alexander Khinstein, formerly Moskovskii Komsomolets 
                                                 
37 Aider Mudzhabaev, MK deputy editor-in-chief, Skype-interview by Vasily Gatov, 25 May 2016. 
38 Ibid. 
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legal and crime editor, was an influential State Duma deputy (2003-2016) and currently advises 
the head of the Russian National Guard. Alexander Perov, Moskovskii Komsomolets news editor 
(1983-1993), is a co-owner of Russia’s most influential PR and reputation management agency 
Raikhlin & Partners who specialize in character assassination. These influential and prominent 
figures form important social capital for Gusev, which became particularly important when the 
pressure on independent journalism increased. Attacking Gusev would mean vicariously 
attacking an old friend of someone who moves in the circles of Putin and Medvedev, which many 
bureaucrats would rather leave well alone.  
Gusev also proved capable in financial matters. The privatization of the newspaper in 1992 
gave him the chance to build his own media empire: as of today, Moskovskii Komsomolets 
publishes 15 titles in Russia and 12 abroad. Even with a decline in copy sales, it remains the city’s 
largest paper (up to 700,000 copies daily) and second largest nationally. This expansion has 
provided Gusev with the opportunity to reward his most loyal cadres generously. For example, 
and in a similar fashion to RIA Novosti, Gusev appointed some of them to head newly created 
sub-contractors, which allowed them to enrich themselves.  
The case of Gusev proves that a late-Soviet nomenklatura cadre is perfectly capable of 
turning into a successful capitalist and private owner of large media assets. Gusev used the 
methods of the nomenklatura – control, coercion and corruption – to run a complex business, 
which is fairly safe from the attacks of competitors or the Kremlin. Gusev has raised generations 
of highly professional cadres. The organizational autonomy of his media outlet and his apparent 
autonomy from the Kremlin have enabled him maintain respect from his former cadres, many of 
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whom have moved on to powerful positions.39 This in turn has helped him sustain an independent 
media outlet.   
Case II: Vladimir Sungorkin (Komsomol’skaia Pravda) 
The case of Komsomol’skaia Pravda’s veteran editor-in-chief and manager Vladimir 
Sungorkin shows the robustness and longevity of nomenklatura practices. Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda, the mouthpiece of the Komsomol Central Committee, is one of the oldest Russian 
newspapers still in print. As at every other national mass media in the Soviet Union, the 
newspaper was managed according to the nomenklatura model. Despite this, Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda was a greenhouse for young journalistic talent and maintained a certain level of 
professional freedom throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. During glasnost’ and 
perestroika, Komsomol’skaia Pravda made big leaps to break with the old nomenklatura practices 
by introducing elections of their editors, collective ownership and a transparent management. This 
internal democracy remained in place till the late 1990s. In the 2000s, Sungorkin, editor-in-chief 
since 1997 (and majority owner from 1994 to 2007), made a complete reversal and went back to 
a nomenklatura-like system. As of today, Komsomol’skaia Pravda is a politically servile, agenda-
manipulating, pro-Kremlin media. 
Sungorkin began his career in 1975 as a reporter for Komsomol’skaia Pravda, covering 
the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, a massive project spanning several Siberian 
regions. As a young journalist, he was determined to get promoted and move to Moscow. That 
meant that he had to demonstrate that his ideological loyalty was uncompromised and, more 
importantly, he had to find a patron among higher nomenklatura members, someone who would 
launch and nurture his early career steps. His initial patron was Evgenii Tyazhel’nikov, the head 
                                                 
39 Pavel Gusev, interview by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.  
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of Agitprop from 1977 to 1982, who often visited the construction site where he always met with 
Sungorkin. These regular meetings provided the young correspondent with a unique opportunity 
to forge an important bond amongst high-ranking nomenklatura circles.40 
A high-ranked Soviet official and Brezhnevite, Mikhail Nenashev, formerly deputy head of 
Agitprop, was made editor-in-chief of another daily, Sovetskaia Rossiia. The newspaper business 
was new to the nomenklatura heavyweight who now had to form an editorial team from scratch. 
He asked Tiazhel’nikov for staff recommendations. Tiazhel’nikov recommended Sungorkin. With 
his well-established links to the regional authorities in Siberia Sungorkin was attractive to potential 
patrons. Sungorkin was moved to Moscow to work for Nenashev. However, the return of 
Aleksandr Yakovlev in 1985 brought inevitable changes to the Brezhnevite elite. In 1986 
Nenashev was downgraded to a position with little importance. As Sungorkin was associated to 
Nenashev, he had to leave Sovetskaia Rossiia. 
Sungorkin was transferred back to Komsomol’skaia Pravda and, surprisingly, appointed 
department editor and editorial board member. Departmental editors enjoyed benefits equal to 
those usually provided only to nomenklatura members. Thus, Sungorkin, whose career prospects 
had briefly looked grim after his former patron was cast out, now became a listed member of the 
Komsomol nomenklatura. 
With onset of Glasnost many heads also started rolling at Komsomol’skaia Pravda which 
opened a corridor of further opportunities for Sungorkin. In 1990 he was promoted to deputy 
editor-in-chief. The same year, everything was collapsing, including the Komsomol. 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda cut off its links to the Party. Between August and December 1991, the 
                                                 
40 Vladimir Sungorkin, “Kukhnia upravliaemoi demokratii”, Otechestvennye zapiski, no. 4 (2003), available 
at http://www.strana-oz.ru/2003/4/kuhnya-upravlyaemoy-demokratii, accessed 30 August 2016. 
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media outlet was privatized by the editorial collective and Sungorkin became chief executive 
director of the joint stock company KP, an acronym of Komsomol’skaia Pravda. Proving himself 
as a capable entrepreneur, he was put in charge of the company’s commercial side.  
In 1991 and 1992 a debate about the newspaper’s future arose. One group of journalists 
wanted to establish a quality paper, whereas the other, headed by Sungorkin, opted for a tabloid. 
Sungorkin won and, thus, several journalists left the newspaper in protest.41 Some disloyal cadres 
were, however, still left. By 1995, Sungorkin managed to eliminate them. From now on Sungorkin 
was in full control of all business and editorial fields.  
Between 1997 and 2007 Sungorkin focused on maximizing his profits trading in KP 
shares. This phase in his career showed that Sungorkin reasoned and behaved like many of the 
big businessmen of his generation, albeit dealing with media assets rather than oil and nickel. 
Sungorkin established himself further by taking on official positions. In the 2000s he became a 
member of the public councils of several ministries. In 2013, he joined a committee that selects 
the nominees for Russia’s official media awards.  
Sungorkin has actively sought control over his competitors by placing his most talented 
and ambitious cadres in competing media outlets. Vladimir Mamontov, formerly executive editor 
of Komsomol’skaia Pravda, later became editor-in-chief of Izvestiia, one of Sungorkin’s main 
rivals. Alexander Strakhov started a managerial career at Komsomol’skaia Pravda. In 2007 he 
was appointed CEO at Sungorkin's arch-rival Argumenty i Fakty. Later he changed to 
                                                 
41 Nataliya Rostova, “Kogda Gorbachev uznal o raskole v ‘Komsomolke’, on sam razyskal nas”, Slon, 15 
December 2010, available at 
https://slon.ru/russia/kogda_gorbachev_uznal_o_raskole_v_komsomolke_on_s-509616.xhtml, accessed 
August 30, 2016. 
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Populiarnaia Pressa, a Russian division of Ukrainian Media Holding which directly competes with 
KP in the TV guide market. The benefits of this strategy for Sungorkin have been two-fold: first, 
these editors, managers and journalists, trained and raised by Sungorkin, reproduce his 
professional approach in their new work places, which makes these competing media outlets far 
more predictable. Second, his former cadres are still loyal to him and, therefore, a rich source of 
insider information. In this way, Sungorkin, aiming at maximum expansion, has secured a large 
network of influence.  
Sungorkin has had his journalists publish numerous scandalous tabloid-type materials, 
engaged them in propaganda, made them write ethically questionable commentary and provide 
information support to various government institutions.42 This has had a negative effect on the 
portfolio and reputation of Komsomol’skaia Pravda journalists, whose credibility and professional 
authority has been undermined. Other media outlets tend to avoid hiring former Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda staff, unless they share the same tabloid-like reputation. These circumstances have made 
the journalists quasi-hostages of Sungorkin, who desperately cling on to their jobs.  
Similar to Moskovskii Komsomolets, Komsomol’skaia Pravda has had few scruples when 
it comes to printing pre-paid and compromising materials43. More importantly, Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda has repeatedly received huge financial subsidies from the Kremlin and regional 
                                                 
42 Some journalists participate in this rather willingly. In some cases even Kremlin’s own press regulators 
have to react to KP’s authors aggressive nationalism. See, “Zhaloba na stat’iu Ul’iany Skobeidy v 
‘Komsomol’skoi pravde’” (Moscow: Obshchestvennaia kollegiia po zhalobam na pressu, 18 July 2013), 
available at http://presscouncil.ru/index.php/praktika/rassmotrennye-zhaloby/2285-zhaloba-na-statyu-
ulyany-skojbedy-v-komsomolskoj-pravde, accessed 30 August 2016. 
43 Elena Evstigneeva, Sergei Rybak, “Donkikhoty ot PR”, Vedomosti, 26 February 2001, available at 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2001/02/26/donkihoty-ot-pr, accessed 30 August 2016. 
 24 
governments for positive coverage of their activities.44 When, with the rise of Putin, the Kremlin 
system of media management strengthened, Sungorkin positioned his newspaper and himself 
close to the Kremlin. Komsomol’skaia Pravda journalists were among the first to subscribe to 
Putin’s ideological narratives, such as anti-Americanism, the chase of ‘foreign agents’ and the 
intimidation of opposition. During the 2012 presidential campaign the newspaper gave huge 
amounts of space to pro-Putin articles.45 Putin personally gave permission to feature in the 
newspaper’s advertising campaigns.46 The journalists who have no scruples about actively 
engaging in this type of journalism get generously rewarded, both materially and with increased 
internal powers.  
Similar to Pavel Gusev, Sungorkin has established subsidiaries where he places his most 
valuable staff, providing them with the opportunity to organize their own loyal followers. A typical 
example for this is Express Gazeta, a sensationalist tabloid owned by KP, which in 2001, 
Sungorkin handed to his old friend Alexander Kupriianov. Another example is KP radio and 
                                                 
44 This open data table demonstrates that KP is actively contracted by the state and regional authorities to 
provide “information support” to their policies. In 2014 alone, KP and its subsidiaries amassed RUR 248 
mln. (approx. USD 6 mln.) in such contracts. See, Goszatraty website, available at 
https://clearspending.ru/supplier/?namesearch=Комсомольская%20правда&search-
submit&regioncode&address&orgform&inn&kpp&sort=-contractsSum, accessed 30 August 2016. 
45 See, the OSCE report on the monitoring of the presidential elections in 2012 “Itogovyi otchet Missii po 
nabliudeniiu za vyborami OBSE/BDPICH”, available at 
http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/elections/90462?download=true, accessed 30 August 2016.  
46 Nataliya Rostova, “’My boremsia, chtoby u nas vse bylo bolee-menee po-khristianski’”, Slon, 3 August 
2009, available at https://slon.ru/russia/my_boremsya_chtoby_u_nas_vse_bylo_bolee_menee_po-
104096.xhtml, accessed 30 August 2016. 
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television, a small and barely visible agency which Sungorkin used as a payoff to senior staff 
whom he decided to replace with more ideologically-aligned newcomers.47 Subsidiaries positions 
could be highly lucrative, especially in the early 2000s, when large cash flows and at least half of 
revenues from advertisements ran through these semi-autonomous organizations. This cash was 
difficult to trace and, therefore, ‘tax-free’. 
Unlike Gusev, Dobrodeev and partly also Mironiuk, who entrust power to managers who 
are personally attached to them and who they leave in the same position for decades, Sungorkin 
regularly renews his team. Many sub-editors and section editors at Komsomol’skaia Pravda have 
only recently joined the media outlet. This serves less the purpose of innovation rather than a 
question of trust. Sungorkin employs and promotes people whom he trusts ideologically and 
whose compliance he can be sure of. They need to hold similar patriotic pro-Kremlin views, not 
require any cajoling or persuasion to do something in the name of Putin and the state and be very 
quick to adjust their writing to the latest Kremlin policy.48 
                                                 
47 See, for example, KP’s managers and editors shuffles in 2006 and 2011-2012. Vladislav Ivanov & 
Tat’iana Kosobokova, “Perestanovki v gazetakh”, Vzgliad, 16 January 2006, available at 
http://www.vzglyad.ru/society/2006/1/16/18980.html, accessed 7 September 2016; Sof’ia Sidorova, “V 
peterburgskoi ‘Komsomol’skoi Pravde’ smenilsia glavnyi redactor”, Lenizdat, 21 March 2014, available at 
https://lenizdat.ru/articles/1119273, accessed 7 September 2016.  
48 See, for example, the KP’s coverage of the Russia-Turkey dispute following the downing of a Russian 
jet. The same people who had called Erdogan a fascist in the fall of 2015, called him a ‘sober friend of 
Russia’ as soon as the Kremlin had agreed to restore relations with Turkey. See, Dar’ia Aslamova, 
“’Komsomolka’ preduprezhdala o tom, chto Erdogan gotovitsia sbit’ nash samolet”, Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda, 24 November 2015, available at http://www.kp.ru/daily/26458/3332210/, accessed 7 September 
2016; Dar’ia Aslamova, “Erdogan ne prochital ni odnoi knigi o diplomatii, zato on mozhet ikh pisat’”, 
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The case of Vladimir Sungorkin and Komsomol’skaia Pravda demonstrates how the 
nomenklatura system is capable of regaining control over ‘lost assets’. In the early 1990's, 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda was among the champions of democratization and liberal values in 
journalism. Sungorkin gradually and successfully eliminated the internal democracy at 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda and established instead a system which strongly resembled the 
temporarily buried practices of the nomenklatura. As Russian politics requested in 2000's, 
Sungorkin obediently turned his newspaper over to the Kremlin, demonstrating ideological 
conformity over any type of political or professional values. Whereas Gusev’s business model 
aims at protection and moderate growth, Sungorkin’s approach is to continuously and 
aggressively expand his business assets and political influence.  
Case III: Oleg Dobrodeev (VGTRK) 
Unlike Sungorkin and Gusev, Oleg Dobrodeev was not a nomenklatura member; neither 
was he born into a nomenklatura family nor did he find a patron in the Soviet nomenklatura. Only 
in the early 1980s, during his time as a PhD student and then researcher at the Institute of 
International Labour Movement did he first encounter nomenklatura members. This Institute had 
close connections with the Party’s more liberal wing and, from 1968 onwards was home to some 
dissenting voices in the Communist Party. Little is known about Dobrodeev’s personal 
development during this time, but it was clear that he was neither particularly fascinated by the 
dissident movement nor did he make sustainable connections to any nomenklatura members.  
Dobrodeev left academia shortly after finishing his PhD and became an editor at the 
prestigious Programma Vremia, the country’s major television news programme. In the remaining 
                                                 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 26 August 2016, available at http://www.kp.ru/daily/26573.4/3588916/, 
accessed 7 September 2016.  
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years of the Soviet Union, Dobrodeev worked his way up to the post of deputy head of the First 
Channel news desk. Whilst before perestroika this position was highly ideological and politically 
controlled, now, in the late 1980s, it was no longer nomenklatura.49 
In 1991 Dobrodeev was invited to run his own daily news programme, Vesti, on the newly 
established state-owned television channel VGTRK. In summer 1990s, Dobrodeev became the 
head of VGTRK’s information department. He stayed in this position until shortly after the failed 
putsch of the conservative Soviet forces in August 1991, when Dobrodeev was invited back to 
the First Channel to head the news service. Dobrodeev’s major task was to reorganize the 
newsroom in a way that it would be loyal to Yeltsin rather than the old elite.50  
The biggest milestone in his career came when he, together with a few colleagues, set up 
the news programme Itogi in 1992. This programme became the cornerstone of the independent 
news channel NTV, which was set up in 1993, with Vladimir Gusinkii as the largest investor. The 
programme design was an emulation of Western television. When Dobrodeev became a top 
manager at NTV, he radically renewed the channel’s editorial structure. Instead of hierarchically-
organized departments and specializations (e.g. politics, culture) NTV relied on a pool of reporters 
who were free to work for any show and newscast and, if they wanted, they could even produce 
their own shows. The editorial process was – as much as it can be – democratic. As Boris Koltsov, 
one of NTV’s most famous reporters, recalls, Dobrodeev maintained a sense of equality among 
                                                 
49 In fact, on television only a few key positions were ever related to the Komsomol or Party 
nomenklatura. The only exception was a handful of celebrity journalists who had permission to cover 
political issues, such as Aleksandr Bovin. Similar to the position of Dobrodeev’s line manager, his editor-
in-chief, his position was not anywhere close to being nomenklatura.  
50 Kirill Kharat’ian, “Dobrodeev sdelal svoe delo. I ukhodit po-dobromu”, Kommersant, 20 January 2000, 
available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/137517, accessed 30 August 2016. 
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the staff up until 1996.51 In the second half of the 1990s, however, nomenklatura practices 
emerged, even at this brand-new media outlet. Within just a year the last vestiges of ‘democracy’ 
in the newsroom were effectively eliminated. Dobrodeev appointed deputies to overlook the news 
reports production and choose loyal and predictable journalists to produce reports.  
Amongst the public, Dobrodeev’s name still stood for professionalism in Russian 
journalism. During the information wars, starting in 1997, an internal division in the NTV 
management emerged. People now were compelled to choose their patron. While Kiselёv and 
Malashenko were supporting Gusinskii’s manoeuvres, Dobrodeev stood up against the abuse of 
NTV as a tool to promote business and political interests.52 In 2001, when the Kremlin snatched 
NTV from Gusinskii, Dobrodeev, participating in a debate between different sides of the conflict, 
wrote a treatise every ethical journalist would sign up to.53  
Already at that point, however, Dobrodeev had sensed very clearly that it would be highly 
advantageous to secure Putin as patron. In 2000 Dobrodeev accepted the position as director-
general back at the state-owned VGTRK. By now that media holding had hugely expanded, 
incorporating among other things Russia’s second most important television channel, several 
radio companies and branches all over the Russian Federation. Those loyal to Dobrodeev 
followed him, leaving NTV in the hands of a team loyal to Kiselёv. 
                                                 
51 Boris Kol’tsov, interview by Vasily Gatov, June 2016, New York. 
52 “Sostoianie TV. Ernst, Dobrodeev i Kulistikov glazami sovremennikov”, Afisha, 22 May 2012, available 
at https://daily.afisha.ru/archive/gorod/archive/ernst-dobrodeev-i-kulistikov/, accessed 30 August 2016. 
53 “Otkrytoe pis’mo Olega Dobrodeeva Evgeniiu Kiselёvu”, RIN.ru, 9 April 2001, available at 
http://lib.rin.ru/doc/i/167658p.html, accessed 30 August 2016. 
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In Soviet times, it was the norm for nomenklatura patrons to move their clientele from one 
appointment to another. In a similar fashion, Dobrodeev took along many of his staff in 2000. He 
appointed the former NTV presenter, Yevgeny Revenko, as his deputy. Revenko started recruiting 
other former NTV cadres. Several senior NTV managers came to take up leading positions at 
VGTRK.  
As with Sungorkin and Gusev, Dobrodeev has made sure that his cadres get positions in 
competing media outlets. For instance, in 2005 he suggested to Putin that he should appoint 
Margarita Simonian, who worked as the VGTRK Kremlin correspondent, as the head of Russia 
Today. Dobrodeev personally backed Simonian’s admission to the infamous Friday meetings at 
the Presidential Administration three years later in the wake of Russo-Georgian war.54 He 
energetically supported the appointment of his deputy Dmitrii Kiselёv, the notorious anchor of the 
weekly Vesti Nedeli, as the head of Rossiia Segodnia, a media holding which was established in 
2013.55 (Kiselev has simultaneously remained deputy to Dobrodeev, and still runs his weekly 
show on the channel Rossiia.) 
Typically for a nomenklatura patron, Dobrodeev has undermined competing patrons and 
their cadres. For instance, Svetlana Mironiuk belonged to a ‘hostile’ patron’s clan. In the years 
from 2008 to 2013, Dobrodeev attempted several ‘takeover’ bids, suggesting that RIA Novosti 
should be incorporated into VGTRK. When these plans failed, he consistently devoted VGTRK 
resources to undermine Mironiuk’s position; for example, by reporting ‘disloyal behaviour’ among 
                                                 
54 Gatov, Putin, Maria Ivanovna..., 6. 
55 Sergei Goriashko, “Gendirektor VGTRK vstupilsia za Dmitriia Kiseleva”, Kommersant, 21 March 2014, 
available at http://kommersant.ru/doc/2436279, accessed 30 August 2016. 
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RIA Novosti staff to the Presidential Administration.56 Dobrodeev and Mironiuk constantly and 
fiercely competed for budget money. Even though VGTRK attracted 60 to 65 percent of state 
subsidies from a pot reserved for federal media and RIA Novosti much less, the performance (in 
terms of income, steady growth and internet dominance) of Mironiuk’s RIA Novosti was much 
stronger at the time of her dismissal. In the ‘clan fighting’ within the Presidential Administration, 
Mironiuk won a greater number of supporters for her cause. However, in the end, Dobrodeev 
turned out to have greater impact and won. He took over RIA Novosti and Mironiuk was sacked 
overnight. 
The examples of NTV and VGTRK show that nomenklaturnost’ can re-emerge even in 
newly-set up media outlets. Although Dobrodeev himself was never part of the Soviet 
nomenklatura, he borrowed many elements to build up his empire. He had already applied some 
nomenklatura practices while heading the private channel NTV: corruption to increase loyalty and 
dependence, coercion between different parts of his staff to keep them ‘busy and engaged’.57 
When Dobrodeev sided with the Kremlin and moved to VGTRK, he immediately brought along 
loyal cadres to strengthen his positions at the state-owned media holding. He has continued to 
corrupt staff ever since by assigning lucrative contracts to production companies loyal to 
VGTRK.58 He has increased his influence and control through placing loyal cadres in good posts 
at rival companies.  
                                                 
56 Personal account of Vasily Gatov who worked as RIA executive director in 2011-2012. 
57 “Sostoianie TV…”. 
58 Roman Dobrokhotov, “Efir v shokolade. Kak Kreml’ dobivaetsia ’pravil’noi’ kartinki na teleekrane”, Slon, 
2 April 2012, available at 
http://slon.ru/russia/efir_v_shokolade_kak_kreml_dobivaetsya_pravilnoy_kartinki_na_telefidenii-
771496.xhtml, accessed 30 August 2016. 
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As a pro-Kremlin media outlet, VGTRK does not raise any criticism of government policies 
or allow out-of-line statements. The editorial routine, from agenda setting to content production, 
is fully controlled by the management.59 VGTRK journalists are not supposed to pitch stories to 
their editors, but, on the contrary, their editors (and sometimes a Kremlin representative) assign 
them their jobs. They usually pick a journalist whose opinion is most compliant with the story that 
is to be written. The whole system relies on self-censorship; anybody who joins the ranks of 
VGTRK is supposed to be compliant. In the end it is, however, the editors’ obligation to Dobrodeev 
to make sure that no hint of disloyalty and incoherence appears on screen60.  
Both Moskovskii Komsomolets and Komsomol’skaia Pravda are in-house content 
producers. VGTRK and many of the television channels (Rossiya-1, for example, but not Vesti-
24) produce only 10-12% of the content they put on air in-house. The rest is commissioned to 
(dependent and independent) production companies. This procedure opens up substantial 
corruption leverage for managers. As a state enterprise, VGTRK must publish tenders and allow 
for an open competitive process. However, public tenders cover less than 15% of production time 
and costs61 while most purchases are processed through an exclusive purveyor. Usually, the 
‘trusted’ purveyor is connected to ‘trusted’ people within VGTRK. Once these intermediaries 
receive the funding, they outsource the job to a subcontracting company while pocketing the 
kickback for the operation. Moskovskii Komsomolets and Komsomol’skaia Pravda are not 
                                                 
59 Alexander Orlov-Mikhailovich, deputy editor of Vesti 24 in 2010-2014, Skype-interview by Vasily Gatov, 
March 2015. 
60 Ibid. 
61 “Zakupochnaia deiatel’nost’ VGTRK”, Rossiia, available at  
http://tendering.vgtrk.com/orders/working, accessed 30 September 2016. 
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fundamentally different in their approaches; the scale, however, is very different as VGTRK is a 
budget-based state enterprise.62  
For example, Rossiya’s most notorious propaganda programmes, Vesti.doc with Ol’ga 
Skabeeva and Special Report with Evgenii Popov, are produced by the agency Tsentral’naia 
Studiia. This legal entity is affiliated to VGTRK; the state enterprise holds minority shares in this 
agency. The remainder is owned by a shell company that is believed to belong to Skabeeva and 
Popov, who benefit from their productions twice; firstly, as employees of VGTRK and, secondly, 
as owners of the company that sells the productions to VGTRK. Most of Dobrodeev’s important 
staff are involved in double profiteering. 
The case of Oleg Dobrodeev is curious in as much as he was never a nomenklatura 
member in the Soviet Union and not even close to it, but has meticulously reproduced 
nomenklatura principles in the 2010s. Dobrodeev has exercised all required components of a 
nomenklatura management model (command, control, corruption) and, like the Communist Party 
in Soviet times, he runs a media outlet which is part of the state’s propaganda machine.  
Conclusion 
In accordance with Granovetter’s theory of cultural-historical embeddedness of market 
mechanisms, we can see how patterns of social relations within large media organizations are 
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being perpetuated along the way to a market economy in Russia. Although the nomenklatura as 
a system of privileged positions disappeared with the break-up of the Soviet Union, certain 
managerial practices typical for the Soviet nomenklatura have been adopted by the members of 
Putin’s media elite. We use the term nomenklaturnost’ to encapsulates the major nomenklatura 
practices visible today.  
The three cases discussed in the article indicate how the principles of nomenklaturnost’ 
can be successfully applied in Putin’s Russia. Having been familiar with the Soviet nomenklatura 
from the very beginning of their careers, Gusev and Sungorkin learnt the basic nomenklatura 
skills from scratch and modified them throughout the years, adapting them to the changing times. 
More interestingly, however, nomenklatura practices have persistently been re-employed no less 
by media managers who belong to the younger generations, have never been part of the Soviet 
nomenklatura and run highly technological and modern organizations. The case of Dobrodeev 
(and to a lesser extent Mironiuk) shows that someone who was never familiar with the Soviet 
nomenklatura might nevertheless embrace very similar practices in his management and 
networking style.  
All three of them can look back to a long-term rule (from 16 to 32 years). For all three of 
them personal loyalty to their respective patrons throughout the years has been the key 
foundation for their success. Equally important for them has been to create personal bonds with 
loyal cadres inside their companies. All three media managers have pursued a strategy of 
spreading their loyal cadres into competing media outlets and political structures with the aim of 
protecting themselves and increasing their influence in the Russian media system. 
Once Gusev became the head of his newspaper, he chose to remain independent. 
Throughout his career he has positioned his loyal cadres in powerful positions outside the media 
so that they form a safety net, which helped him protect his company and sustain his weight as 
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someone the authorities ought to see as an equal. This gives him a leeway to criticize the 
authorities, but may bring him into conflict with members of Putin’s elite. Sungorkin, in contrast, 
turned his newspaper into a resource loyal to the Kremlin and always at its disposal. His journalists 
and editors can quickly change their political views in agreement with the state line. This approach 
has secured Sungorkin a lucrative business and a place in the highest echelons of power. As for 
his loyal cadres, he has used them to expand within the media market and to receive insight into 
competitor media outlets. 
In the Soviet Union the violation of ideological principles promoted by the Communist Party 
could ruin a bureaucrat’s career and, thus, ideology, played a crucial role in disciplining and 
controlling people. In post-Soviet Russia, ideological ideas have been widely absent. Instead, the 
major tools of control are informal and corrupt practices. The state allocates money to the major 
media outlets, thus enforcing the media managers’ loyalty. In turn, media managers control the 
loyal cadres through financial perks. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Sungorkin and Gusev 
quickly turned their assets into private property. For Dobrodeev, the issue of financial success 
has become the driver to oust Mironiuk and gain control over RIA Novosti.  
Unlike in Soviet times where privileges have played an important role but money was 
secondary, in today’s Russia the importance of financial incentives to ensure the loyalty and 
compliance of one’s cadres is hard to underestimate. Financial benefits are rewarded directly and 
indirectly. This is often done through seemingly independent production companies and 
subcontractors, personally affiliated with key cadres in the head company, who benefit from 
lucrative contracts. As long as the actions of loyal cadres do not contradict the current Kremlin 
line and the patron’s personal interests, cadres are free to do what they want.  
Tracing the origins and perpetuation of nomenklaturnost’ can contribute to a better 
understanding of why professional and ethical values in the media world have deteriorated very 
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quickly in post-Soviet Russia. People’s compliance (in exchange for material benefits and career 
opportunities) is a key factor here. The nomenklatura practices Gusev and Sungorkin were 
socialized into never envisioned replacing the basic organizing principles, obedience and loyalty, 
with professionalism and ethical standards. The only exception here is Dobrodeev whose 
approach to news production used to be very professional, until his arrival at VGTRK in the early 
2000s. However, his views changed dramatically as soon as he had moved up the political 
hierarchy. In his case, nomenklaturnost’ replaced very directly the democratic mechanism he had 
previously introduced himself.  
